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PERSPECTIVE
Negotiating and the Congressional Conference
Process: A Case Study of the Export
Administration Act & the Omnibus
Trade Bill
Jennifer. White*
The midnight shift at the Government Printing Office sealed up
an ordinary cardboard box addressed to the Bill Clerk. Its contents
were forty final copies of the Export Administration Amendment Act
of 1985, one of which would be placed on the President's desk in the
Oval Office for signature.
Printing the bill took less than twenty-four hours. It took over
twenty-four months, however, to agree to its contents. Reaching a
consensus between the House of Representatives and the Senate on
how U.S. exports should be controlled spent the energies of all con-
cerned. Endless hearings, committee mark-ups, floor actions, and
congressional conferences were necessary to meld the two widely
differing bills reauthorizing the control of U.S. exports for national
security, foreign policy, and short supply reasons. The outcome,
however, was determined less by the substantive differences between
the House and Senate and more by the manner in which each side
demonstrated skill in negotiation technique.
Any understanding of the legislative process requires a funda-
mental understanding of bargaining and negotiation theory. It is
particularly applicable in assessing the proceedings of conferences
between the House and the Senate where the two bodies have mu-
tual power to both agree and to veto. The focus of this analysis cen-
ters on the actions and successful resolution of the House and
Senate conference on the Export Administration Amendments Act
(EAA) of 1985. Additional comment is provided on the negotiations
between the House and Senate on export control reforms contained
in the Omnibus Trade Bill, H.R. 3, presently before Congress.
One negotiation theory, processual analysis, offers an explana-
* Republican Staff Consultant for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcom-
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, U.S. House of Representatives.
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tory model quite relevant to the legislative process. According to this
analysis, outcomes are explained by the manner in which parties pro-
gress toward an end goal. That is, given a target point, negotiating
parties move at concession rates based on the actions of the oppos-
ing party, opening positions, and security points.' The key factor in
processual analysis is that each side tends to concede only at the rate
of the opposition. In other words, concessions by one side will elicit
reciprocal concessions by the other.
Processual analysis, or for that matter negotiation theory, is less
compelling in explaining legislative outcomes within a single body of
Congress. Motivations of legislators are based on various factors,
such as the merits of the arguments, party loyalties, constituent inter-
ests, personal vendettas or favors, procedural maneuvers, personal
publicity, or hidden agendas.
These elements are considerably subsumed, however, in a con-
gressional conference. Once a conference is set between the House
and Senate, legislators appointed as conferees negotiate for their re-
spective legislative bodies. Reaching a compromise package of legis-
lation acceptable to both bodies of Congress is clearly the
preeminent goal of all parties. As a negotiator, the legislator no
longer represents personal interests, but is accountable to the insti-
tution for a successful outcome.
This Perspective will examine the case of the renewal of the EAA
in three distinct phases-the 98th, 99th, and the 100th Congress. It
will also examine the reenactment of the EAA within the conference
negotiations of the export provisions of the Omnibus Trade Bill.
I. The Export Administration Act
A. The Players
In the case of the Export Administration Act (EAA), five sena-
tors and fifteen congressmen2 spent over six months in conference
ironing out the differences between the two houses of Congress.
During the 98th Congress, conferees met on fourteen separate occa-
sions to negotiate before the session ended.3
I W. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 166 (1982).
2 Senate conferees were Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.), Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah), Sen.
John Tower (R-Tex.), Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), and Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Cal.).
House conferees were Rep. Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), Rep. Don
Bonker (D-Wash.), Rep. Steve Solarz (D-N.Y.), Rep. Dan Mica (D-Fla.), Rep. Michael
Barnes (D-Md.), Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.), Rep.
Howard Berman (D-Cal.), Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Cal.), Rep. Toby Roth (R-Wis.), Rep.
Olympia Snowe (R-Me.), Rep. Douglas Bereuter (R-Nev.), Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.),
and Rep. Ed Zschau (R-Cal.). There were seven other conferees who contributed and
voted only on specific sections of the bill. They included Representatives Gibbons, Jones,
Frenzel, Hutto, Byron, Courter, and Gray.
3 The conferees were appointed in March 1984 and the session ended on October
11, 1984.
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Most of the members involved in the 1979 reauthorization of the
EAA had changed by 1984. 4 In 1979 eight congressmen were on
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade-five Democrats and three Republicans. In 1984
there were ten members on the subcommittee-seven Democrats
and three Republicans, only three of whom had also served in 1979.5
On the Senate side, a number of changes had also occurred. Unlike
in 1979, the 1984 Republican-controlled Senate produced new mem-
bers and a new chairman for the Senate Banking International Fi-
nance Subcommittee. 6 Five Republicans and four Democrats sat on
the subcommittee, only three of whom had also served in 1979.7
B. The 98th Congress
Three Republicans and two Democrats sat on the Senate confer-
ence bench, and before the conference began, Senators Heinz and
Garn agreed to support each other's key interests.8 Senators
Proxmire and Cranston looked to the Democratic majority on the
House side to carry their views. The House conference bench con-
sisted of ten Democrats and five Republicans. Coalitions on various
issues frequently crossed party lines. For example, the Republicans
needed three Democratic votes to carry their viewpoint, and the con-
ference chairman relied on Republican votes to carry some of the
more pro-business positions.
The Senate conferees had an advantage going into the negotia-
tions, as they had a better understanding of the bill and its legislative
history. This led to the Senate's tough opening position and its
dominant role in influencing the pace of concession. Further handi-
capping the House was a heated dispute within the Administration
on key provisions of the bill. Many of these provisions involved
4 In 1979, the Democrats on the Foreign Affairs International Economic Policy and
Trade Subcommittee were Rep.Jonathan Bingham, Rep. Don Bonker, Rep. Donald Pease,
Rep. Michael Barnes, and Rep. Howard Wolpe. In 1984, the membership included Rep.
Don Bonker, Rep. Dan Mica, Rep. Howard Berman, Rep. Edward Feighan, Rep. Michael
Barnes, Rep. Howard Wolpe, and Rep. Sam Gejdenson. The Republicans in 1979 were
Rep. Robert Lagomarsino, Rep. Paul Findley, and Rep. Benjamin Gilman. In 1984, they
were Rep. Toby Roth, Rep. Olympia Snowe, and Rep. Douglas Bereuter.
5 Neither the Chairman, Rep. Don Bonker, nor the Ranking Member, Rep. Toby
Roth, had served on the subcommittee when the EAA had last been reauthorized. Thus,
only three of the subcommittee members were familiar with the previous congressional
debate.
6 Sen. John Heinz served as chair-person and Sen. William Proxmire as ranking
member. Other members included Sen. Jake Garn, Sen. William Armstrong, Sen. Mack
Mattingly, Sen. Chic Hecht, Sen. Alan Cranston, Sen. Alan Dixon, and Sen. Don Riegle.
7 In 1979, the Democrats on the Senate Banking International Finance Subcommit-
tee were Sen. Adlai Stevenson, Sen. Harrison Williams, Sen. Alan Cranston, and Sen. Paul
Tsongas. The Republicans were Sen. John Heinz, Sen. William Armstrong, and Sen.
Nancy Kassebaum.
8 As long as Heinz and Garn agreed on a position it carried, because Heinz also held
Senator Tower's blanket proxy.
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transferring jurisdictions between the Departments of Commerce
and Defense, and Commerce and Customs. 9 The Commerce De-
partment had been designated by the White House as the lead
agency responsible for EAA reauthorization. Throughout the con-
ference, however, members often questioned whether Under Secre-
tary Lionel Olmer was speaking for the Administration on a
particular legislative provision or whether his views reflected the
Commerce agenda. The Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and
Customs met with members and independently expressed their views
of what they considered constituted the Administration's position.
As the EAA conference moved into October, the Administration's
position diffused, even as rumors surfaced that Olmer was leaving
the government. As a result, less weight was given by conferees to
an official Administration position. At the outset, when the Adminis-
tration's credibility was high, its officials played a significant role in
the negotiations. As it became apparent to the negotiators that de-
partmental self-interests were overriding appropriate solutions and
Administration brokers were engaged in destructive tactics, however,
the Administration's influence was greatly diminished.
C. Elements of the Senate Negotiating Position
The House and Senate had passed vastly different reauthoriza-
tion bills reflecting divergent philosophical approaches on export
controls. The Senate was committed to several objectives in re-
newing the EAA, such as stopping or significantly reducing the trans-
fer rate of militarily critical technologies to the Soviet bloc. To
achieve this objective, the Senate sought to increase sizably the role
of the Defense Department in the export licensing process. Another
goal was to enhance the deterrence factor for illegal technology traf-
ficking by improving enforcement and stiffening penalties. Finally,
the Senate was also interested in eliminating the use of trade sanc-
tions as a foreign policy tool except under extraordinary circum-
stances, and granting absolute sanctity of business contracts in the
event trade sanctions were imposed. This position was a direct re-
sult of the Soviet gas pipeline sanctions.
D. The House Negotiating Position
The House was committed to a different agenda. Its principal
objectives included assisting the U.S. exporting community by
streamlining the export licensing process and eliminating where pos-
sible the need for licenses. This position stood against giving any
additional oversight or licensing responsibilities to DOD. The
House also wanted to mandate that the executive branch take ac-
9 The Senate generally championed the case of the Defense Department and Cus-
toms, while the House most often advocated for the Commerce Department.
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count of the availability, from non-U.S. sources, of comparable
goods and technologies when imposing national security and foreign
policy controls. It hoped to exempt virtually all agricultural exports
from export controls, to have considerable flexibility in the use of
foreign policy controls, particularly for purposes of condemning
human rights practices by other nations, and to impose sanctions
against South Africa.
E. The EAA Conference
From April until October 1984, Congress and its staff fashioned
compromises in many areas of the bill, and less controversial matters
were easily resolved.' 0 Many of the issues were settled at the staff
level, with members ratifying the recommendations of the staff in
conference. Their commitments on revisions of the bill always re-
flected the dispositions of the two key Senators, Garn and Heinz.
The House majority counsel could not as easily represent the views
of its members, partly due to a change in staffing on the minority
side two months into the conference process. Thus, coordinating
concessions between House Democrats and Republicans to present a
united case was difficult. Furthermore, several Republican House
members wanted the Senate positions to prevail.
A typical conference meeting showcased Senator Heinz carrying
the Senate view. Senator Garn trusted Senator Heinz to stick with
their pact, so he was rarely in attendance. Although Senator
Proxmire came to most of the conference sessions, he was virtually
powerless to oppose the positions of Heinz and Garn. It was an in-
timidating tactic which worked against the House. For a position to
carry on the House side, eight firm votes were necessary, and as a
result, the House frequently conceded to the Senate position. It was
therefore predominantly the Senate which controlled the rate of con-
cessions. Nevertheless, the House held the powers of veto and of
inaction.
Although many of the issues were resolved by mid-summer
1984, progress on the major provisions of the bill was hampered by
linkages and pacts made between members, and concessions
dropped to a minimum. An additional constraint was the considera-
tion of the role of the Defense Department in reviewing West-West
licenses-the so-called 10-G provision. Senator Garn was adamant
about this provision because he believed that too much U.S. technol-
ogy was flowing to the Soviet bloc through third-channel Western
10 Provisions concerning enforcement, violations, embedded microprocessors, the
militarily critical technologies list, mandates for COCOM negotiations, import sanctions,
agricultural exemptions, foreign availability, general licensing provisions and types of
licenses, nuclear exports, exports to COCOM countries, and short supply controls were
resolved.
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countries, and that the Commerce Department, because of its predis-
position for trade, was partially responsible for these widescale So-
viet acquisitions. The House took the position that it was
unnecessary to grant additional review authority to the Defense De-
partment. Instead, they argued that by eliminating the requirement
for Commerce to license West-West low-technology sales, the de-
partment could better concentrate its resources on reviewing high-
technology exports. Conference members were unwilling to budge
on the issue of 10-G. Votes were taken several times in the House
with the result consistently 14-1 against granting any additional stat-
utory authority to the Defense Department to review West-West
licenses.
From mid-summer to October, House and Senate negotiators
ratified minor items negotiated at the staff level. The liberal mem-
bers of the House, led by Representative Steve Solarz, knew that they
could carry the votes on the House side for the Senate contract sanc-
tity provision. In exchange, however, Solarz wanted a commitment
from the Senate on South African sanctions. Heinz delayed any con-
sideration of South African sanctions, hoping in the interim to win
enough House members over to his side on the contract sanctity is-
sue. The final conference meeting ended in a stalemate. Contract
sanctity, 10-G, and South African sanctions were still unresolved.
Garn denounced House members' defense of the Commerce Depart-
ment's handling of export licenses. House conferees were unmoved,
however, concluding that time and again the Senate had scored at
the expense of House positions. The conference adjourned in a
stand-off.
F. The Last 48 Hours
The threat of seeing two years of work wasted changed the
mood of the conference. Before October, both sides believed the
other would give in, but with Congress set to adjourn at any mo-
ment, it appeared almost certain that each side's gains would be lost.
With less than four weeks to go before elections, everyone was anx-
ious to return to their districts.
Amid this anxious atmosphere, a simple solution was proposed.
Early in the 98th Congress, the House had sent to the Senate a one-
page extension of the 1979 EAA, H.R. 4230. The Senate could
amend H.R. 4230 on the floor by adding all of the sections accepted
by conferees and by developing a compromise package on the three
outstanding contentious items-contract sanctity, South African
sanctions, and 10-G. To pass the bill in the Senate, there had to be
unanimous consent.
The Senate and House staff realized that success in the Senate
depended on a compact of absolute silence on the game plan. If
[VOL. 13
1988] NEGOTIATING THE OMNIBUS TRADE BILL 339
anyone wanted to kill the bill-a lobbyist, an official in the executive
branch, or a disgruntled member-he would only need the objection
of one senator, so Senators Heinz and Garn would stake out an ap-
propriate moment on the Senate floor when the fewest number of
members would be present. It was well-known that the Commerce
Department, ostensibly representing the Administration, no longer
supported the bill." I
G. The Compromise
The Senate-fashioned compromise contained all of the sections
agreed to by conferees and a compromise on the three remaining
contentious items. First, Senator Garn surprisingly agreed to drop
his insistence on 10-G in exchange for the removal of all but one of
the four proposed sanctions against South Africa.' 2 Senator Heinz
offered a fallback position on contract sanctity allowing contracts to
be broken under extraordinary conditions of "breach of the peace."
Through this compromise, everyone gave up a key position.
The Senate's proposal illustrated Hicksen's tenet that a party will
concede if the cost of holding out-no bill-is greater than the con-
cession. Senators Garn and Heinz concluded that they had more to
gain by conceding on their positions than by coming up empty
handed. Once Congress adjourned, the entire reauthorization pro-
cess would have to begin again, and the 1984 elections would change
the composition of the negotiating teams.' 3
As it turned out, no senators chose to confront Senators Gan
I Three distinct voices emanated from the Administration. The Commerce Depart-
ment had been designated as the lead agency on EAA. Lionel Olmer, the Under Secretary
for International Affairs, was the principal spokesperson for the Administration in the
open conference meetings. On a number of occasions, however, Senate conferees chal-
lenged the positions he espoused and postulated that they did not reflect the Administra-
tion's view. The second Administration voice came from Lyn Withey, a congressional
liaison at the White House. She was assigned the EAA bill very late in the course of events
and it was her job to field departmental concerns with the various sections of the bill. The
third voice was reflected in Senator Garn's actions. He held certain positions in order to
obtain a bill acceptable to the Reagan Administration. Senator Garn held the line on 10-G
to eliminate or tone down Title 3 on South Africa. He did not want to send a bill to the
White House that would force a veto immediately prior to the elections. The sanctions
against South Africa were the key. It was believed that Senator Garn would only endorse a
bill if assured that the President would sign it.
12 Title 3 of the EAA bill contained four sanctions against South Africa: (1) A re-
quirement that U.S. companies invested in South Africa comply with the Sullivan fair em-
ployment principles, (2) a ban on U.S. bank loans to the South African government or
parastatals, (3) a ban on the U.S. importation of Krugerrands, and (4) a ban on further
investment by U.S. companies in South Africa. The Senate compromise included the first
requirement-U.S. companies comply with the Sullivan principles. For those companies
not showing good faith efforts to comply, the President would be authorized to prohibit
further investments by the companies in noncompliance. See 134 CONG. REC. H12,159
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
IS Senator Garn was also scheduled in the spring for a NASA Space Shuttle trip. If a
decision were put off until then, the Senate could not act until he returned.
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and Heinz; the bill passed without objection and was sent to the
House for consideration. House staffers had only a few hours to re-
view the package before assembling the conference members for an
11:00 P.M. meeting of the Rules Committee, where the staff would
obtain permission to bring the bill up on the floor the following
morning. Unfortunately, the order of the provisions in the Senate
bill had been rearranged, subtle word changes had been made, and
some sections were curiously outdated. House staffers later learned
that the Senate staff had inadvertently fashioned the compromise
from a two-week old working document, which failed to reflect im-
portant changes that had been made in conference.
House members became suspicious of the Senate concessions
and the rearranged bill, and in an effort to gain a little more, they
made a mistake that eventually killed the compromise. The confer-
ence chairman added to the compromise package a ban on U.S. bank
loans to South Africa. If passed as an amended bill by the House, it
would again have to be unanimously approved by the full Senate.
This miscalculated move by the House members killed the bill, and
Congress adjourned without a reauthorization for the EAA.
In retrospect, an EAA bill would have been passed given more
time and trust during the conference proceedings. If House mem-
bers had been less suspicious of the Senate's motives, they would not
have tampered with the compromise in the closing hours.
H. Phase Two: The 99th Congress
The experience of the EAA conferencing and the frenetic expe-
rience of the last-minute salvaging attempts sobered both sides. The
effort had exhausted everyone, and other subcommittee work had
already been delayed to accommodate the renewal of EAA. By now,
everyone agreed, including the Administration, that the Senate com-
promise had been fair.14
On the first day of the new congressional session, Representa-
tive Toby Roth introduced H.R. 28, a comprehensive set of amend-
ments to the EAA which contained all of the Senate compromises.
Since Representative William Gray had determined that he would go
forward with an independent bill on South African sanctions, the
EAA bill considered in the 99th Congress did not contain any such
sanctions. House members, however, decided to make it clear that
14 In both the House and the Senate, members were unimpressed with the manner in
which the EAA reauthorization was handled by the Administration. Sen. Heinz said it was
" 'depressing ... to see the Administration handle their negotiations with us with what
somebody might describe as a lack of integrity.' . . . [Elverytime a deal was made, 'they
tried to back out of it and ask for more.' . . . Olmer was speaking for a vested interest, the
Commerce Department ... Olmer 'overrepresented his case' when he said he was speak-
ing for the Administration." Heinz Says Next Move to Reauthorize Export Administration Act
Should Come From House, [Jan.-June] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 86 (Jan. 16, 1985).
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H.R. 28 would not be an opening negotiating position with the Sen-
ate, but a final one. This was the important turning point leading to
a successful outcome in the 99th Congress.
In an unusual step, Chairman Don Bonker agreed to take up
consideration of Roth's bill rather than introduce one of his own.
Subcommittee and committee mark-up proceeded with no debate,
and only minor technical changes were made in the bill.' 5 To recip-
rocate the chairman's gesture, Roth asked that the bill be reported
out as a committee bill, H.R. 1786, cosponsored by all members.
House floor action soon followed with no opposition or protracted
debate. The consideration of the bill from subcommittee mark-up to
House action took less than a month, as the contents of the bill were
virtually identical to the Senate compromise.
The Senate staff recommended that the safest way to act quickly
was to pass a simple ninety-day extension of the EAA of 1979. This
was the best approach since the Senate rules made it easier for non-
germane amendments to be attached to bills. The two bodies would
simply meet in a pro forma conference in which the Senate would
accede to the entire House bill. This action was taken following the
Memorial Day recess, and it demonstrated that a consensus had been
forged on the renewal of the EAA. Phase two was a time for reflec-
tion and reassessment of the costs of either starting over or reaching
an agreement on the current deal. Momentum and exhaustion dic-
tated the second choice. Both parties came away from the table de-
claring victory and a satisfactory outcome. In this case, concession
behavior accounted for the initial breakdown in negotiations and for
an eventual satisfactory settlement.
During the two-year negotiation process, each side continually
gauged the behavior of the other, as concessions depended on the
actions of the other side. When negotiations failed in phase one,
both sides reassessed their previous concession behavior and took
steps to enhance trust-building. For example, members on the
House side made it publicly known that the Senate compromise had
been fair. The Senate, by passing a simple extension, demonstrated
it had no desire to reopen the export control debate. Processual
analysis was useful in pinpointing what went wrong in phase one of
the negotiations, and it served to prescribe a formula necessary for a
successful outcome in phase two. It also served to explain why Con-
gress took over twenty-four months to reauthorize the EAA.
II. The Omnibus Trade Bill: The 100th Congress
Although the 1985 EAA reauthorized the President's authority
15 In addition to technical amendments, Rep. Wolpe withdrew his provisions regard-
ing nuclear exports and changes were made on Senator Proxmire's provision concerning
nuclear cooperation agreements.
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to control exports until September 1989, further modifications to the
EAA were approved by the House in 1986. Those amendments were
reintroduced in the House on January 7, 1987, as part of the Omni-
bus Trade Bill, H.R. 3. That same month, the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) released a major study assessing the effects of na-
tional security export controls on U.S. economic competitiveness.
Many of the NAS findings generated further export control amend-
ments so that by the time both the House and Senate passed sepa-
rate Omnibus Trade Bills, it was clear that another major revision of
the EAA was underway.
Once again U.S. export controls would be subject to a congres-
sional conference. The outcome for industry and U.S. national se-
curity would again be tied to the concessional behavior of the House
and Senate negotiators sent to the conference table. On the House
side, the ten conferees chosen to negotiate the export control provi-
sions were largely the same as those who had negotiated the 1985
amendments.' 6 Only two members, Representatives Bilbray and
Miller, were new to the subcommittee. To help negotiate two of the
export control provisions, House conferees were chosen from
outside the Foreign Affairs Committee. Three conferees were in-
cluded from the Armed Services Committee to help with the 10-G
issue,' 7 and three additional conferees were appointed to help with
the Toshiba sanctions issue, making for a group of twenty House
negotiators. 18
In organizing the seventeen subconferences for H.R. 3, House
Speaker Jim Wright resolved jurisdictional disputes by allowing any
Committee with an interest in a particular issue to be considered
conferees. As a result, some 150 congressmen were chosen to con-
ference the various provisions of the trade bill. Fifty-one separate
groupings of negotiators were assigned to resolve the differences be-
tween the House and Senate bills. In effect, virtually every Commit-
tee was involved in conferencing the Omnibus Trade Bill. In
dispensing with the traditional Committee jurisdictional lines, how-
16 House conferees included six Democrats and four Republicans: Rep. Dante Fas-
cell (D-Fla.), Rep. Don Bonker (D-Wash.), Rep. Dan Mica (D-Fla.), Rep. Howard Berman
(D-Cal.), Rep. Mel Levine (D-Cal.), Rep. James Bilbray (D-Nev.), Rep. William Broomfield
(R-Mich.), Rep. Toby Roth (R-Wis.), Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.), and Rep. John Miller
(R-Wash.). Senate conferees included three Democrats and two Republicans: Sen. Wil-
liam Proxmire (D-Wis.), Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), Sen. Alan Dixon (D-Ill.), Sen. Jake
Garn (R-Utah), and Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.).
17 Conferees from the Armed Services Committee included Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.),
Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.), and Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.).
18 Conferees from the Foreign Affairs Committee included Reps. Fascell, Bonker,
Mica, Broomfield, and Roth. Conferees form the Ways and Means Committee included
Reps. Rostenkowski, Gibbons, Downey (D.-N.Y.), Archer, and Schulze. Conferees from
Government Operations included Reps. Brooks, Conyers, Neal, Horton, and Walker.
Conferees from the Armed Services Committee included Reps. Aspin, Stratton,
Mavroules, Badham, and Hunter.
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ever, a dangerous precedent was set for future considerations of any
trade matters. Committees that are conferencing export control
matters for the first time will undoubtedly attempt to claim jurisdic-
tion again in the future.
Conference staff members began meeting in September 1987 to
resolve differences between the House and Senate positions. The
concession behavior of the previous conferences began to reappear,
and compromises were reached quickly on the less controversial
matters. Fifty-four separate issues were put forth and eventually or-
ganized into three categories: (1) issues considered resolved pro-
vided that members agreed with the staff recommendations; (2)
issues likely to be resolved at the staff level; and (3) issues that would
require members to meet directly to negotiate. Staff negotiations
proceeded at a steady pace through October and as many issues as
possible were placed in the first category. House leadership urged
the trade conferees to complete all negotiations by the mid-Decem-
ber close of the session. Staff negotiations began to bog down as
more difficult issues were considered, and both sides were reluctant
to give up potential bargaining chips that might be needed later in
the negotiations. As the deadline approached, the Senate sent a
comprehensive proposal to the House suggesting trade-offs on all of
the export reform matters, except for four issues to be resolved by a
meeting of the conferees. The outstanding controversial issues
were: (1) Alaskan oil export controls; (2) export licensing require-
ments for items exported to COCOM and non-COCOM destina-
tions; (3) DOD's role in reviewing West-West licensing; and (4)
sanctions against Toshiba Machine Corporation and Kongsberg
Vaapenfabbrikk (also known as the Garn amendment).
On the first issue, the House bill expanded current restrictions
on the export of crude oil from Alaska to include all domestically
produced crude oil. Refined petroleum products produced by ex-
port refineries were also subject to the restrictions. The Senate had
no comparable provisions on crude oil and essentially prohibited ex-
port restrictions on refineries already in operation. Although both
the House and Senate bills removed certain export licensing require-
ments for both COCOM and non-COCOM destinations, the bills dif-
fered in the degree of liberalization and the exceptions provided.
The House completely eliminated any export licensing requirements
for U.S. shipments to COCOM countries except for "extraordinarily
sophisticated" goods or technology. The Senate threshold level cap-
tures more items that would still require export licenses.
With respect to the third issue, the role of DOD in reviewing
export licenses, the House bill prohibited the department from re-
viewing any export shipments to free world destinations and limited
its review to East-bloc-destined shipments only. The Senate bill had
1988]
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no comparable provision. Finally, the Senate bill required a
mandatory two to five year ban on imports from Toshiba Machine
Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabbrikk as retaliation for the il-
legal diversion of Toshiba Machine Company milling machines to
the Soviet Union. Because the Toshiba scandal broke after the
House acted on the trade bill, there was no comparable provision on
the House side.
Although these four issues remained, the Senate proposal broke
the deadlock in staff negotiations. The package delineated most of
the areas where members were willing to make trade-offs, and the
House returned a comprehensive counterproposal to the Senate two
weeks later. Despite these efforts, negotiations were interrupted by a
change in the imposed deadline, and further conference meetings
were postponed when it became clear that the House leadership was
not going to take up the trade bill before the end of the session. It
was not until February that conferees resumed consideration of the
bill. Although staff recommendations had been made on all export
control reform issues, the House had yet to develop a counterpro-
posal on the Toshiba sanctions. Neither side wanted to consider the
Toshiba issue on its own, but preferred to link concessions on
Toshiba to concessions on export control reform.
Anticipating that the Senate would be reluctant to accept signifi-
cant liberalization of export licensing requirements or removal of
DOD in the West-West licensing review process, the House pro-
posed a minimalist response on Toshiba sanctions. The proposal of-
fered a list of sanctions from which the President could choose,
including a one percent tariff on products imported from Toshiba
Machine Company. The sanctions were discretionary, and any com-
pany with contracts or purchase agreements with Toshiba Machine
Company signed by the time Congress enacted the legislation was
exempted from the import ban. Among House conferees, the pro-
posal was controversial. Nine out of the eleven conferees voted
against it. When the Toshiba proposal was sent to the Senate, it was
poorly received, and less than two weeks later the Senate returned a
counterproposal that omitted previous compromises and reinstated
original positions. Communications between the House and Senate
were breaking down, and both sides were retreating from good-faith
efforts made in previous months.
Facing conferees was the March 23rd deadline imposed by the
House leadership, and all matters on the trade bill were to be re-
solved by that date. Outstanding controversial issues would be
dropped altogether from H.R. 3. Just as in previous consideration of
export controls, it would not be surprising to see another game of
brinkmanship. Although neither side wanted to see its work wasted,
the threat of deleting both Toshiba sanctions and export control re-
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forms had advantages and disadvantages for both sides. From the
viewpoint of the Senate, the Administration had sufficient authority
to implement export control reforms if it wanted to do so, without
additional legislation. From the House perspective, the Garn
amendment on Toshiba would be excessively damaging to U.S. eco-
nomic interests.
With the reauthorization of the EAA scheduled for 1989 with a
vastly different set of players, industry is understandably interested
in seeing export control reforms enacted in the trade bill. The major
proponent of export control reform on the House side, Rep. Don
Bonker, is running for the Senate.' 9 Another consideration will be
the extent to which it appears that other controversial matters in the
trade bill are ultimately dispensed with by other trade conference
groups. If it appears that the bill will be one that the President will
be inclined to sign, members will likely be more apt to fashion a com-
promise on export controls at the last minute. If H.R. 3 emerges as a
partisan piece, designed to evoke a presidential veto, members may
be more inclined to balk at further concessions.
All of these factors will be on the minds of the House and Senate
negotiators as the clock winds down and the trade conference draws
to an end. For some, the outcome may be mounds of papers and
files thrown by the wayside; to others, it may be a welcomed sigh of
relief. For the veteran, negotiating the EAA is now a familiar cycle
that seems fated for endless repetition. With the new year and the
101st Congress, members will start the process once again, with
hearings, mark-up, floor debates, and passage of widely differing ex-
port control reform bills forcing the appointment of House and Sen-
ate conferees. While the merits of the arguments may in many
instances determine the results of future congressional conferences,
the interested observer may be better served in predicting and un-
derstanding outcomes by more closely examining negotiation and
concession behavior.
19 Rep. Dan Mica, another reform proponent, is also running for a Senate seat.
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